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EMPLOYMENT PRACTICES AND SEX DISCRIM-
INATION: JUDICIAL EXTENSION OF BENEFICIAL
FEMALE PROTECTIVE LABOR LAWS
During the first half of this century, a substantial majority of
states enacted legislation designed to shield the growing number of
women entering the work force from certain employment hazards
and from potential abuse by employers.' Although widely believed to
be desirable social legislation recognizing the physiological and func-
tional differences between the sexes,2 such laws are increasingly being
I Exemplary of these laws are: (1) statutes regulating the maximum hours per day and per
week that a woman may be employed (see,e.g., CAL. LABOR CODE § 1350 (West 1971); ILL. ANN.
STAT. ch. 48, § 5 (Smith-Hurd 1969); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 103.02 (Supp. 1973)) or restrictions on
night work (see, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 31-19 (1972); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 275:17,
275:17-a (1955 & Supp. 1972); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, §§ 104, 105 (Supp. 1973)), (2) laws
preventing the placement of females in jobs requiring movement of objects over a specified
weight (see, e.g., CAL. LABOR CODE §§ 1251-52 (West 1971); MAss. ANN. LAWS ch. 149, § 53A
(Supp. 1972); OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 4107.43 (Page 1965)), (3) legislation precluding employ-
ment within specified periods before and after delivery of a child (see, e.g., MAss. ANN. LAWS ch.
149, § 55 (1965); P.R. LAws ANN. tit. 29, §§ 467-74 (Supp. 1972)), (4) occupational prohibitions,
such as bartending and mining (see, e.g., ARIZ. REv. STAT. ANN. § 23-261 (1971) (coal mining);
ARK. STAT. ANN. § 52-612 (1971) (coal mining); OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 4107.43 (Page 1965)
(crossing watchman, bellhop, express driver, and other occupations); R.I. GE. LAws ANN. §
3-8-2 (Supp. 1972) (bartender)), (5) minimum wage (see, e.g., ARIZ. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 23-311 to
329 (1971); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 48, §§ 198.1-.17 (Smith-Hurd 1966); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 104.02
(1957)) and overtime pay regulations applicable only to women (see, e.g., ARK. STAT. ANN. §
81-601 (1960); CAL. LABOR CODE § 1350.5 (West Supp. 1973); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 59-5-1 (Supp.
1971)), (6) regulations requiring employers to afford females alunch break (see, e.g., ARK. STAT.
ANN. § 81-410 (1960); OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 4107.42 (Page 1965)) or a specified number of
rest periods (see, e.g., ARK. STAT. ANN. § 81-609 (1960); Ky. REV. STAT. § 337.365 (1962)), and (7)
legislation requiring special physical facilities for women (see, e.g., ARK. STAT. ANN. § 81-620
(1960); CAL. LABOR CODE 1253 (West 1971); COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 80-2-13 (1963)).
2 See PRESIDENT'S COMM'N ON THE STATUS OF WOMEN, REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON
PROTECTIVE LABOR LEGISLATION 1-2, 8-11, 22 (1963); Hearings on S.J. Res. 61 and S.J. Res. 231
Before the Senate Comm. on theJudiciary, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 28-45 (1970) (statement of M.
Wolfgang, Vice-President, Hotel and Restaurant Employees Union) [hereinafter cited as
Hearings].
Historically, protective labor legislation has been invalidated on substantive due process
grounds as inhibiting the freedom to contract in connection with one's business and the sale of
one's labor. In Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905), the Supreme Court held that a law
providing that no laborer shall be required or permitted to work in a bakery more than 60 hours
in a week or ten hours in a day was not, with regard to men, a legitimate exercise of the police
power of the state. The law was viewed by the Court as an unreasonable and arbitrary
interference with the right of the individual freely to contract with respect to his labor.
When protective laws regulate the working conditions of women, however, the states have
wide discretion within which to exercise the police power to correct identified abuses. See, e.g.,
West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379,394-400 (1937); Adkins v. Children's Hosp., 261
U.S. 525, 570 (1923) (Holmes, J., dissenting); Miller v. Wilson, 236 U.S. 373 (1915); Muller v.
Oregon, 208 U.S. 412 (1908).
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challenged as emanating from Victorian notions of a woman's role in
society and as proliferating incidents of employer discrimination. 3
While often collectively referred to as female protective legisla-
Female protective legislation first received constitutional sanction in Muller v. Oregon, 208
U.S. 412 (1908). In upholding a statute prohibiting the employment of women in laundries for
more than ten hours per day, the Court held that there was a difference in the scope of
legislative power over the regulation of employment of women as contrasted to that of men:
The two sexes differ in structure of body, in the functions to be performed by each, in
the amount of physical strength, in the capacity for long-continued labor, particularly
when done standing, the influence of vigorous health upon the future well-beingof the
race, the self-reliance which enables one to assert full rights, and in the capacity to
maintain the struggle for subsistence. This difference justifies a difference in legisla-
tion and upholds that which is designed to compensate for some of the burdens which
rest upon her.
208 U.S. at 422-23.
Subsequent Supreme Court cases continued to uphold legislation pertaining only to terms
of female employment. See Goesaert v. Cleary, 335 U.S. 464 (1948) (prohibiting female bar-
tenders); West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, supra, at 398-99 (minimum wage); Radice v. New
York, 264 U.S. 292 (1924) (prohibiting women from working in restaurants at night); Miller v.
Wilson, supra, at 382-83 (prohibiting overtime for women working in hotels); Riley v. Mas-
sachusetts, 232 U.S. 671 (1914) (setting maximum hours for women in factories). See generally
Comment, Are Sex-Based Classifications Constitutionally Suspect?, 66 Nw. U.L. REv. 481 (1971).
3 Protective legislation prevents . . . women from going into the higher salary
brackets. Yes, it certainly does.
Women are protected-they cannot run an elevator late at night and that is when
the pay is higher.
They cannot serve in restaurants and cabarets late at night-when the tips are
higher-and the load, if you please, is lighter.
So it is not exactly helping them-oh, no, you [men] have taken beautiful care of
the women.
110 CONG. REC. 2580-81 (1964) (remarks of Representative St. George). A similar complaint was
voiced by Representative Martha Griffiths:
Some people have suggested to me that labor opposes "no discrimination on
account of sex" because they feel that through the years protective legislation has been
built up to safeguard the health of women .... Most of the so-called protective
legislation has really been to protect men's rights in better paying jobs.
Id. at 2580.
See also CITIZEN'S ADVISORY COUNCIL ON THE STATUS OF WOMEN, REPORT OF THE TASK
FORCE ON LABOR STANDARDS 2 (1968); INTERDEPARTMENTAL COMM. ON THE STATUS OF WOMEN,
AMERICAN WOMEN 1963-1968, at 19-20 (1968).
The topics of female protective laws and sex discrimination have been popular with legal
commentators as well. See, e.g., L. KANOWITZ, WOMEN AND THE LAW: THE UNFINISHED
REVOLUTION 111-31, 143-47, 178-92 (1969); Barnard, The ConflictBetweenState ProtectiveLegisla-
tion and Federal Laus Prohibiting Sex Discrimination: Is It Resolved?, 17 WAYNE L. REV. 25 (1971);
Berg, Title VII: A Three-Years' View, 44 NOTRE DAME LAW. 311,332-36 (1969); Brown, Emerson,
Falk & Freeman, The Equal Rights Amendment: A Constitutional BasisforEqual Rightsfor Women, 80
YALE L.J. 871,922-36 (1971); Durant, The Validity of State Protective Legislationfor Women in Light
of Title VII ofthe CivilRightsActofl964, 6 SUFFOLK L. REv. 33 (1971); Kennedy,SexDiscrimination:
State Protective Laws Since Title VII, 47 NOTRE DAME LAW. 514 (1972); Murray & EastwoodJane
Crow and theLaw: Sex Discrimination and Title VII, 34 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 232 (1965); Seidenberg,
The Submissive Majority: Modern Trends in the Law Concerning Women's Rights, 55 CORNELL L. REV.
262 (1970); Developments in the Law-Employment Discrimination and Title VII of the CivilRights Act of
1964, 84 HARV. L. REV. 1109, 1186-95 (1971).
SEX DISCRIMINATION
tion, certain of these laws have an exclusionary effect since they
pertain to women generally and thereby preclude individually
qualified females from being considered for certain jobs.4 Other
protective statutes have proven beneficial to women by improving
their working conditions and increasing their compensation. 5 How-
ever, when females receive additional benefits by virtue of state law, a
discriminatory situation results with respect to similarly situated
males who do not receive such benefits. Protective legislation result-
ing in female sex discrimination has been found in conflict with and
thus pre-empted by Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.6 A
controversy exists as to whether protective laws genuinely considered
to confer a benefit or privilege on women are to be pre-empted as
well, or whether the differential in employment benefits between the
sexes resulting from these laws will be eliminated by extending their
benefits to male employees. This extension argument surfaced dur-
ing the lively debate surrounding the Equal Rights Amendment,7 and
has been urged by proponents of the Amendment to quiet the fears of
those who predict that the Equal Rights Amendment will adversely
affect the hard-won beneficial protective labor legislation for
women.
8
' See, e.g., Rosenfeld v. Southern Pac. Co., 444 F.2d 1219, 1225 (9th Cir. 1971) (maximum
hours and weightlifting statutes); Manning v. General Motors Corp., 3 Emp1. Prac. Dec. 7145,
7150, 3 F.E.P. Cas. 968, 973-74 (N.D. Ohio 1971), affd, 466 F.2d 812 (1972) (maximum hours
and weightlifting laws); Ridinger v. General Motors Corp., 325 F. Supp. 1089, 1096 (S.D. Ohio
1971) (occupational prohibitions, maximum hours, and weightlifting laws); Jones Metal Prods.
Co. v. Walker, 29 Ohio St. 2d 173,177-78,281 N.E.2d 1, 6 (1972) (occupational prohibitions and'
maximum hour statutes).
5 For example, a Wisconsin statute (Wis. STAT. ANN. § 103.16 (1957)) in pertinent part
provides:
Every person or corporation employing-females in any manufacturing, mechanical or
mercantile establishment in the state of Wisconsin shall provide suitable seats for the
females so employed, and shall permit the use of such seats by them when they are not
necessarily engaged in the active duties for which they are employed.
New Mexico also has a beneficial protective statute, which provides in pertinent part:
No female shall be employed ... within the state more than eight (8) hours in any
one (1) day of twenty-four (24) hours, nor more than forty-eight (48) hours in any one
(1) week ofseven (7) days. The provisions of this act... shall not apply to... any female
who signs a written agreement to work more than eight (8) hours a day or more than
forty (40) hours a week; provided that every such agreement shall provide for an
hourly rate of compensation equal to one and one-half (1 2) times the regular hourly
rate of pay, for each hour in excess of forty (40) hours which are worked in any one (1)
week.
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 59-5-1 (Supp. 1971).
' 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-15 (1970). See note 9 and accompanying text infra.
H.R.J. Res. 208, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. (1972). The proposed Amendment is set forth in the
text accompanying notes 75-76 infra.
8 See notes 78 & 82-84 and accompanying text infra.
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I
EXTENSION BY FORCE OF TITLE VII
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibits discriminatory
employment practices on the basis of sex.9 Although the prohibitions
of the Civil Rights Act could be read as not affecting the validity of
existing state protective legislation,"0 the "equal treatment" mandate
of Title VII has been construed to permit only narrow exceptions to
Title VII sets forth the basic substantive law for employers:
(a) It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer-
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to
discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, condi-
tions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's race, color, religion,
sex, or national origin; or
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees in any way which would
deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employment opportunities or otherwise
adversely affect his status as an employee, because of such individual's race, color,
religion, sex, or national origin.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (1970). The provision applies to employers of 25 or more employees (id. §
2000e(b)), but explicitly excepts state and federal governmental units (id. § 2000e(b)(1)), private
membership clubs (id. § 2000e(b)(2)), and religious enterprisesand educational institutions (id. §
2000e-1).
10 The threshold question is whether protective laws have continued validity in light of the
nondiscriminatory requirement of Title VII. The legislative history surrounding the adoption
of "sex" as one of the forbidden bases of discrimination in the Civil Rights Bill is inconclusive as
to whether Congress intended to pre-empt certain protective legislation of the states. The initial
bill was directed at the elimination of employment discrimination on the basis of race, color,
religion, or national origin. H.R. REP. No. 914, 88th Cong., Ist Sess., pt. 1, at 10, 27 (1963). Sex-
as a prohibited basis of discrimination was added to the bill by one of its strongest opponents,
Representative Smith of Virginia. See 110 CONG. Rc. 2577 (1964).
Representative Celler, the floor manager of the bill, used the threat of federal pre-emption
when arguing against the amendment: "Would the many state and local provisions regulating
working conditions and hours of employment for women be struck down? ... This is the
entering wedge, an amendment of this sort. The list of foreseeable consequences ... is
unlimited." 110 CONG. REC. 2577-78 (1964). Representative Multer was in accord with this
concern, suggesting the possible "repeal by implication" of female protective laws.Id. at 2732. In
contrast, Representatives Griffiths and St. George indicated they would welcome elimination of
such laws by pointedly raising the issue that some protective legislation has actually been
harmful, having prevented women from holding certain higher paying jobs. Id. at 2580-81.
Although joining with her two colleagues in support of the Amendment, Representative Kelley
noted that she was "sure the acceptance of the amendment [would] not repeal the protective
laws of the several States." Id. at 2583.
With such a dichotomy in the views expressed, little congressional intent can be found,
except, perhaps, an implicit recognition that some protective laws were worth preserving while
others had worked in derogation of female equality.
[lit seems unrealistic to speak of an intent of Congress in the sense of an actual
consensus among the supporters of the amendment that it would accomplish any
particular result not plainly inferable from the language of the amendment and the
logic of the title as a whole.
Berg,supra note3, at 332 n.1 17.But see Rosenfeld v. Southern Pac. Co., 444 F.2d 1219, 1226 n.7
(9th Cir. 1971).See generally Miller, SexDiscrimination and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 51
MINN. L. REv. 877, 879-85 (1967).
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the principle that females be hired and promoted solely on the basis
of their individual capabilities." Differentials in employment prac-
11 Initially, the bona fide occupational qualification (BFOQ) exception was thought to
allow distinctions in employment practices based on sex resulting from an employer's adher-
ence to state protective laws and regulations.
Notwithstanding any other provision of this subchapter, (1) it shall not be an
unlawful employment practice for an employer to hire and employ employees ... on
the basis of... religion, sex, or national origin in those certain instances where religion,
sex, or national origin is a bona fide occupational qualification reasonably necessary to
the normal operation of that particular business or enterprise.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e) (1970). Originally, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
held that in some instances state protective laws would be regarded as a legislative determination
of the BFOQ exception's applicability.
The Commission does not believe that Congress intended to disturb such laws and
regulations which are intended to, and have the effect of, protecting women against
exploitation and hazard. Accordingly, the Commission will consider limitations or
prohibitions imposed by such state laws or regulations as a basis for application of the
bona fide occupational qualification exception.
30 Fed. Reg. 14,927 (1965). See also Bowe v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 272 F. Supp. 332, 364-65
(S.D. Ind. 1967), rev'd, 416 F.2d 711 (7th Cir. 1969).
Presently, however, the BFOQ is narrowly construed as not shielding state protective laws
from being superseded by the Civil Rights Act. "Construed ... broadly, the exception will
swallow the rule." Weeks v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 408 F.2d 228, 235 (5th Cir. 1969);
accord, Rosenfeld v. Southern Pac. Co., 444 F.2d 1219, 1227 (9th Cir. 1971); Manning v.
General Motors Corp., 3 Empl. Prac. Dec. 7145,7151,3 F.E.P. Cas. 968,975 (N.D. Ohio 1972);
Ridinger v. General Motors Corp., 325 F. Supp. 1089, 1094-95 (S.D. Ohio 1971); Jones Metal
Prods. Co. v. Walker, 29 Ohio St. 2d 173, 181-82, 281 N.E.2d 1, 8 (1972); cf. Diaz v. Pan
American World Airways, Inc., 442 F.2d 385,387 (5th Cir. 1971); Bowe v. Colgate-Palmolive
Co., 416 F.2d 711,717-18 (7th Cir. 1969).Butcf. Phillips v. Martin Marietta Corp., 400 U.S. 542,
544 (1971) (BFOQ defined as attribute "reasonably necessary to the normal operation of that
particular business or enterprise").
The recently revised Equal Employment Opportunity Commission regulations provide
that the BFOQ exception "should be interpreted narrowly." 37 Fed. Reg. 6835, 6836 (1972).
Only "[w]here it is necessary for the purpose of authenticity or genuineness" will sex be
considered a BFOQ.Id. The Commission gives as an example of an appropriate application of
the exception an audience's preference for an actor or actress playing a given role. Id.
Both a general saving clause (42 U.S.C. § 2000h-4 (1970)) applicable to the entire 1964 Civil
Rights Act and a specific saving clause (id. § 2000e-7) added to Title VII were designed to ensure
that Congress would not be understood as intending to occupy the field to the exclusion of
similar state fair employment laws. The specific saving clause was designed to preserve the
effectiveness of state antidiscrimination laws. See 110 CONG. REC. 7243, 12,721 (1964) (remarks
of Senators Case and Humphrey). The general saving clause was in the Act to retain state laws
aimed at preventingor punishing discrimination. H.R. REP. No. 914,88th Cong., 1stSess., pt. 1,
at 27 (1963) (remarks of Representative Meader).
However, no specific mention is made of state protective labor legislation in either of these
two clauses. Accordingly, the courts have found that Congress did not specifically intend to
preserve or to pre-empt protective laws by either of the saving clauses. See Rosenfeld v.
Southern Pac. Co., 444 F.2d 1219, 1226 (9th Cir. 1971); Manning v. General Motors Corp., 3
Empl. Prac. Dec. 7145, 7150, 3 F.E.P. Cas. 968, 973 (N.D. Ohio 1971); Ridinger v. General
Motors Corp., 325 F. Supp. 1089, 1094 (S.D. Ohio 1971); Utility Workers Local 246 v. Southern
Cal. Edison Co., 320 F. Supp. 1262, 1264 (C.D. Cal. 1970).
This interpretation is buttressed by the fact that the saving clauses were included in the Civil
Rights Bill before "sex" was added as an impermissible category of discrimination. Jones Metal
Prods. Co. v. Walker, 29 Ohio St. 2d 173, 179-80, 281 N.E.2d 1, 7 (1972).
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tices and conditions resulting from state enforcement of female pro-
tective labor laws are therefore in violation of the 1964 Civil Rights
Act.' 2 It follows that an employer cannot refuse to hire or promote
women solely to avoid providing a benefit required by a protective
law.' 3 Nor can an employer continue to afford female employees
benefits pursuant to state laws while failing to provide the same
benefits to males. 4 Either both or neither of the sexes must be
provided the job benefits.
A. Developing the Framework for Extension
The courts and the Equal Employment Opportunity Commis-
sion (EEOC), the federal agency charged with the responsibility of
administering Title VII,' 5 had three alternatives for the elimination
of differentials in job benefits resulting from female protective
legislation: 16 (1) finding all protective legislation inconsistent with
and thus pre-empted by Title VII; (2) holding some of the protective
laws superseded while retaining others by extending the benefits to
male employees; or (3) equalizing the differential in job benefits by
extending all protective laws to embrace male employees.'
12 See Rosenfeld v. Southern Pac. Co., 444 F.2d 1219, 1225, 1227 (9th Cir. 1971); Manning
v. General Motors Corp., 3 Empl. Prac. Dec. 7145, 7150-51, 3 F.E.P. Cas. 968, 973-75 (N.D.
Ohio 1971); Garneau v. Raytheon Co., 323 F. Supp. 391,394 (D. Mass. 1971); General Elec. Co.
v. Young, 4 Empl. Prac. Dec. 6233, 6237, 3 F.E.P. Cas. 560, 565 (W.D. Ky. 1971); Kober v.
Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 325 F. Supp. 467,474 (W.D. Pa. 1971); LeBlancv. Southern Bell Tel.
& Tel. Co., 333 F. Supp. 602, 609 (E.D. La. 1971); Ridinger v. General Motors Corp., 325 F.
Supp. 1089, 1096 (S.D. Ohio 1971); Rinehart v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 4 Empl. Prac. Dec.
5053,5055 3 F.E.P. Cas. 851,854 (N.D. Ohio 1971); Caterpillar Tractor Co. v. Grabiec, 317 F.
Supp. 1304,1307 (S.D. Ill. 1970); Utility Workers Local 246 v. SouthernCal. Edison Co., 3 2 0 F.
Supp. 1262, 1265 (C.D. Cal. 1970); Richards v. Griffith Rubber Mills, 300 F. Supp. 338,340 (D.
Ore. 1969);Jones Metal Prods. Co. v. Walker, 29 Ohio St. 2d 173, 183, 281 N.E.2d 1, 9 (1972).
See also 37 Fed. Reg. 6835, 6836 (1972).
13 See cases cited in note 12 supra. See also 37 Fed. Reg. 6835, 6836 (1972).
14 Title VII is equally applicable to sex-based discriminatory practices adverse to males.See
Rosen v. Public Serv. Elec. & Gas Co., 328 F. Supp. 454 (D.N.J. 1970);Jones Metal Prods. Co. v.
Walker, 29 Ohio St. 2d 173, 179, 281 N.E.2d 1, 7 (1972). See also Steelworkers Local 1104 v.
United States Steel Corp., 4 Empl. Prac. Dec. 6328, 6342,4 F.E.P. Cas. 1103, 1117 (N.D. Ohio
1972), affd, 5 Empl. Prac. Dec. 7974, 5 F.E.P. Cas. 1121 (6th Cir. 1973).
15 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-4 (Supp. 1972),amending 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-4 (1970). The EEOC
had only the power to investigate charges of violations of Title VII and to bring about
compliance with the statute through "informal methods of conference, conciliation, and per-
suasion." Act ofJuly 2, 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, § 706, 78 Stat. 259. The Commission had no
authority to issue judicially enforceable cease and desist orders. See Sheet Metal Workers Local
104 v. EEOC, 439 F.2d 237, 238-39 (9th Cir. 1971); Durant, supra note 3, at 42 n.70. The Equal
Employment Opportunity Act of 1972 (42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-5 (Supp. 1972)) significantly
enhances the power of the EEOC to prevent unlawful employment practices.
" See Durant, supra note 3, at 42-46; cf. L. KANOWITZ, supra note 3, at 117-24.
17 Faced with little guidance from legislative history and substantial disagreement among
interested union and nonunion female employees, the EEOC took a very cautious position on
the continued validity of state protective legislation. See Berg, supra note 3, at 333 n. 121. The
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The third alternative is not tenable given industrial realities.18
For example, the extension of maximum-hours laws to male em-
ployees would be intolerable in many businesses which, either be-
cause of the seasonal nature of the work or because of the impossibil-
ity of precisely predicting labor needs, require considerable overtime
employment. 19
The appeal of the second alternative, selective pre-emption, is
that it would permit the retention of that protective labor legislation
which is genuinely beneficial to women. 20 Following this line of
reasoning, protective laws can be divided into two categories: (1)
those which "prohibit" or "restrict" the employment of women in
particular circumstances; 21 and (2) those which confer additional
benefits on female employees.2  Although some regard the first
EEOC simply found it "difficult, from a legal point of view, to assume that Congress intended to
overthrow the laws and regulations of over forty states." Id. at 333.
Shortly after taking office, the chairman of the EEOC called on Congress to clarify its intent
regarding any seeming conflicts between state protective laws and the sex prohibition of Title
VII. See Hearings on H.R. 8998 and H.R. 8999 Before the Subcomm. on Labor of the House Comm. on
Educ. and Labor, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 105 (1965) (statement of F. Roosevelt Jr., Chairman,
EEOC).
In its Guidelines on Discrimination Because of Sex, adopted in November 1965, the EEOC
chose a compromising posture. While calling on states to update "archaic provisions" of their
protective labor laws and renewing an invitation to Congress to consider this problem, the
Commission postponed the more difficult question of pre-emption of protective laws by allow-
ing "such state laws [and] regulations as a basis for application of the... [BFOQ] exception." 30
Fed. Reg. 14,926-27 (1965).
For nearly three years following the adoption of the Guidelines, the EEOC did not declare
that any protective laws were pre-empted or that Title VII required extension of benefits to
male employees.See Berg,supra note 3, at 333-36. Because the Commission had no enforcement
powers of its own, it came to realize that only litigation would resolve the issue. Accordingly, in
August 1966, the EEOC issued a policy statement that it would not make any determination on
the merits of cases in which parties were alleging discrimination as a result of state protective
legislation. Rather, it would merely inform the charging party of the right to seek a judicial
determination under 42 U.S.C. § 200e-5(e).Id. at 335. In February 1968, the EEOC rescinded
the policy statement of 1966, and gave notice that "in cases where the effect of State protective
legislation appears to be discriminatory rather than protective, the Commission will proceed to
decide whether that legislation is superseded by the [1964 Civil Rights] Act." 33 Fed. Reg. 3344
(1968).
18 L. KANOWITZ,supra note 3, at 183; Barnard,supra note 3, at 65; Brown, Emerson, Falk &
Freeman, supra note 3, at 928-29; Durant, supra note 3, at 54.
19 Similarly, many businesses would find unduly burdensome the extension of laws pro-
hibiting the lifting or carrying of weights over a specified maximum. The extension of laws
restricting night work would completely shut down those employers whose manufacturing
process requires uninterrupted operation or whose plant and equipment is so expensive that
economics necessitate three work shifts.
20 See L. KANOwrrz, supra note 3, at 123, 182, 188; Durant, supra note 3, at 55-56; Note,
supra note 3, at 1188-89.
21 See statutes cited in groups (1)-(4) in note I supra.
12 See statutes cited in groups (5)-(7) in note 1 supra. The terms "prohibitive" and
"beneficial" have become words of art commonly used as a shorthand means of referring to
these two categories of protective laws. Use of these terms is not intended to imply that
1973]
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category of protective legislation to be highly desirable,23 these em-
ployment laws preclude all women from being placed in those jobs
with work requirements considered by state legislatures to be unsuit-
able for females.24 Since the effect is to ignore an individual female's
personal qualifications and choice of employment, these "pro-
hibitive" or "restrictive" female protective laws are increasingly being
considered pre-empted by Title VII. 25
The "beneficial" category of protective labor legislation does not
bar women from certain jobs. Instead, these laws are designed to
improve the working conditions of women and to increase their
compensation by requiring that minimum benefits or facilities be
provided whenever an employer hires or promotes a woman. 26 Ac-
cordingly, these laws can have both favorable and unfavorable effects
on women. For a female job-seeker the result is discriminatory if the
employer is inclined to hire a male to avoid providing the additional
benefits required for female employees. 27 Once employed, however,
"prohibitive" laws are always detrimental to females or that laws in the "beneficial" category
cannot result in discriminatory employment practices.
The distinction between the two categories of protective laws was first made by the EEOC at
an early stage of the interpretation of Title VII.See 30 Fed. Reg. 14,927 (1965). Curiously, these
early guidelines only implicitly suggested a reason for the distinction. A clearer rationale for the
categories began to surface the following year. See EEOC, FIRST ANNUAL DIGEST OF LEGAL
INTERPRETATIONS: JULY 2, 1965 THROUGH JULY 1, 1966, at 24 (1966) (opinion letter of March 1,
1966, GC 227-66, and opinion letter of March 22, 1966, GC 181-66).Seegenerally Barnard,supra
note 3, at 41-44; Brown, Emerson, Falk & Freeman,supra note 3, at 922-23; Durant,supra note
3, at 34; Kennedy, supra note 3, at 515-16.
23 See note 2 and accompanying text supra.
24 See note 4 and accompanying text supra.
2' See Rosenfeld v. Southern Pac. Co., 444 F.2d 1219 (9th Cir. 1971) (maximum hours and
weight lifting); Garneau v. Raytheon Co., 323 F. Supp. 391 (D. Mass. 1971) (maximum hours);
General Elec. Co. v. Young, 4 Empt. Prac. Dec. 6233, 3 F.E.P. Cas. 560 (W.D. Ky. 1971)
Imaximum hours); Kober v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 325 F. Supp. 467 (W.D. Pa. 1971)
(maximum hours); LeBlanc v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 333 F. Supp. 602 (E.D. La. 1971)
(maximum hours); Manning v. General Motors Corp., 3 Empl. Prac. Dec. 7145, 3 F.E.P. Gas.
968 (N.D. Ohio 1971) (maximum hours and weight lifting); Ridinger v. General Motors Corp.,
325 F. Supp. 1089 (S.D. Ohio 1971) (prohibited occupations, maximum hours, and weight
lifting); Rinehart v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 4 Empl. Prac. Dec. 5053, 3 F.E.P. Cas. 851 (N.D.
Ohio 1971) (prohibited occupations and weight lifting); Utility Workers Local 246 v. Southern
Cal. Edison Co., 320 F. Supp. 1262 (C.D. Cal. 1970) (weight lifting); Caterpillar Tractor Co. v.
Grabiec, 317 F. Supp. 1304 (S.D. I11. 1970) (maximum hours); Richards v. Griffith Rubber Mills,
300 F. Supp. 338 (D. Ore. 1969) (weight lifting); Jones Metal Prods. Co. v. Walker, 29 Ohio St.
2d 173, 281 N.E.2d 1 (1972) (occupational prohibitions and maximum hours).
Several state attorneys general have also ruled that their state protective laws are superse-
ded by the 1964 Civil Rights Act as to Title VII employers. See, e.g., [1972-1976] Ky. ATr'Y GEN.
Op. 2-132 (maximum hours); 59 Wis. ATr'Y GEN. OP. 114 (1970) (maximum hours). See also 37
Fed. Reg. 6835, 6836 (1972).
21 See note 5 and accompanying text supra.
27 Considering an Arkansas statute requiring that females be paid time and a half for hours
worked in excess of eight hours per day and 48 hours per week, the court in Potlatch Forests,
Inc. v. Hays, 318 F. Supp. 1368, 1373 (E.D. Ark. 1970), affd,465 F.2d 1081 (8th Cir. 1972),
stated:
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the female is in a better position than her male counterparts since she
must be afforded benefits in accordance with state law.28
Thus, although the two categories of protective laws can be
conceptually distinguished, each category can result in discrimina-
tory practices against women. 29 The question that remains is whether
beneficial protective laws conflict with Title VII and are pre-empted
by it.30
B. The Remedy of Extension
Potlatch Forests, Inc. v. Hays3 was the first judicial attempt to
reconcile an alleged conflict between Title VII and a state beneficial
The Arkansas statute does not forbid an employer from hiring women for more than
eight hours a day or forty-eight hours a week; but, in the Court's estimation, the
purpose of the statute was to discourage such employment by commanding premium
pay for it.
28 In the latter cas& it is really the male employees who are being discriminated against.
This double-edged discrimination has led onejudge to quip that "[o]ne is tempted to rejoin that
a state regulation which discriminates against both sexes discriminates against neither." Rivera
v. California Div. of Indus. Welfare, 265 Cal. App. 2d 576, 604, 71 Cal. Rptr.739, 762 (1968).
29 For cases in which beneficial protective laws have resulted in discriminatory practices
adverse to females, see Burms v. Rohr Corp., 346 F. Supp. 994 (S.D. Cal. 1972) (rest periods);
Steelworkers Local 1104 v. United States Steel Corp., 4. Empl. Prac. Dec. 63-28, 4 F.E.P. Cas.
1103 (N.D. Ohio 1972), affd, 5 Empl. Prac. Dec. 7974,5 F.E.P. Cas. 1121 (6th Cir. 1973) (lunch
breaks); General Elec. Co. v. Young, 4 Empl. Prac. Dec. 6233, 3 F.E.P. Cas. 560 (W.D. Ky. 1971)
(rest periods); Manning v. General Motors Corp., 3 Empl. Prac. Dec. 7145, 3 F.E.P. Cas. 968
(N.D. Ohio 1971) (seating law); Jones Metal Prods. Co. v. Walker, 29 Ohio St. 2d 173, 281
N.E.2d 1 (1972) (rest periods, lunch breaks, and seating laws).
For examples of discriminatory employment practices resulting from prohibitive protec-
tive legislation, see cases cited in note 25 supra.
31 In circumstances in which state beneficial protective laws have clearly resulted in dis-
criminatory employment practices (see note 29 supra), the unavoidable conclusion is that these
laws frustrate the equal treatment policy of Title VII. Therefore, consideration of the supre-
macy clause becomes paramount in determining whether beneficial laws are pre-empted by
Title VII.
Determining whether a state statute is inconsistent with a federal law and thus superseded
by force of the supremacy clause requires "a two-step process of first ascertaining the construc-
tion of the two statutes and then determining the constitutional question of whether they are in
conflict." Perez v. Campbell, 402 U.S. 637, 644 (1971). In construing the two laws, it is
established that conflicts are not to be presumed and that both statutes should be read in
harmony whenever possible. Reid v. Colorado, 187 U.S. 137, 148 (1902). The court must look to
the effect of the state statute on the objectives of the federal law and not to the purpose of the
state legislature in enacting the law. Perez v. Campbell, 402 U.S. 637, 652 (1971). Various
judicial "tests" have been advanced for determining whether a state law or regulation should be
invalidated under the supremacy clause: whether the state law "stands as an obstacle to the
accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress" (Hines v.
Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941)); if "the purpose of the federal statute would to some extent
be frustrated by the state statute" (Colorado Anti-Discrimination Comm'n v. Continental
Airlines, Inc., 372 U.S. 714, 722 (1963)); or if there is "such actual conflict between the two [laws]
that both cannot stand" (Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 141
(1963)). It is apparent that none of these formulae provides a litmus paper test for determining
supremacy clause pre-emption. See Hines v. Davidowitz, supra.
2" 318 F. Supp. 1368 (E.D. Ark. 1970), remanded on other grounds, No. 20654 (8th Cir., filed
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protective law by adopting the extension approach. In Hays, an em-
ployer brought suit against the Arkansas Commissioner of Labor
seeking declaratory and injunctive relief 32 with regard to the validity
of a state labor law requiring that women be paid time-and-a-half for
all hours worked in excess of eight hours per day and forty hours per
week.3 3 The employer argued that the state law could not be enforced
against Title VII employers because the classification was on its face
"discriminatory on account of sex and.., contrary to and inconsistent
with the provisions of Title VII."3 4 The employer conceded that if the
state law was not pre-empted, the equal treatment policy of Title VII
required extension of the overtime pay provisions to men.35 The
employer's position was simply that the federal law occupied the field
to the exclusion of state laws which would otherwise "prevent national
uniform operation of federal legislation intended by Congress to
provide a uniform solution to a national problem. 3 6
The federal district court was careful to note that no issue of
discrimination against male employees had been presented.37 Nor
had the employer contended that the state statute resulted in dis-
criminatory practices against women,3 8 although the court recog-
nized that the practical effect "of the statute was to discourage
[female] employment by commanding premium pay for it."39
The court reasoned along the following lines: ()Title VII re-
quires that male and female employees be treated equally; (2) in this
case there was no factual showing that the overtime pay law had
resulted in discriminatory practices; (3) therefore, the state and fed-
eral laws were not in conflict so as to call for supremacy clause
pre-emption; (4) since the "overtime pay for women" law was not
pre-empted, equal treatment required that the overtime pay re-
quirement be extended to males. 40 The court was careful to leave
May 7, 1971) (unreported), affd, 3 Empl. Prac. Dec. 7008, 4 F.E.P. Gas. 112 (E.D. Ark. 1971),
affd, 465 F.2d 1081 (8th Cir. 1972).
3' 318 F. Supp. at 1369.
33 ARK. STAT. ANN. § 81-601 (1960):
No female shall be employed in this State ... by any person, persons, partnership,
or corporation whatsoever in any capacity except in those occupations that are ex-
pressly exempted by law, for more than eight (8) hours in any one [ 1] day or more than
six (6) consecutive days in any one (1) week, unless such female employee receives
compensation for her employment in excess of the hours above specified at the rate of
not less than one and one-half[ 1 A] times the regular rate atwhich she is employed....
34 318 F. Supp. at 1371.
35 Id. at 1374.
36 Id.
37 Id. at 1373.
'8 See 465 F.2d at 1082 n.3.
39 318 F. Supp. at 1373.
40 Id. at 1375.
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open the question of whether there would, be pre-emption if sex
discrimination were shown to result from a beneficial protective
law.41
The Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed. 42 Appar-
ently, the court of appeals mistakenly understood the employer's
argument to be that the state statute had resulted in discrimination
against his male employees in violation of Title VII.4 3 Significantly,
the Eighth Circuit opted for the extension approach in the face of an
allegation of male discrimination thus inadvertently going beyond
the holding of the district court. The rationale of the court of appeals
appeared to be that any conflicts between Title VII and beneficial
protective legislation could be avoided given the possibility of
extension.
44
A more analytical approach would first distinguish between pro-
hibitive and beneficial protective laws. Whereas prohibitive laws pre-
clude women from being placed in certain jobs,45 beneficial laws do
not compel an employer to discriminate against women. The latter
statutes require him only to provide additional pay or facilities.46
When this distinction is recognized, the test of supremacy clause
pre-emption becomes not whether the state beneficial law resulted in
discriminatory practices, but rather whether the law compelled it.4 7 It
s In two other cases courts have refused to find state protective laws pre-empted by Title
VII without a showing of discrimination between the sexes arising from the state law.See Rivera
v. California Div. of Indus. Welfare, 265 Cal. App. 2d 576,71 Cal. Rptr. 739 (1968); Ridinger v.
General Motors Corp., 325 F. Supp. 1089 (S.D. Ohio 1971).
42 465 F.2d at 1082-83, 1084. On appeal, the employer argued for the first time that the
state statute discriminated against women by discouraging their employment. The employer
produced a letter written by the Arkansas Department of Labor as evidence that the purpose of
the law was to limit overtime hours of women. But the court refused to consider the contention
because the district court had made no finding in that regard, nor was there evidence in the
record tending to show that the statute had a discriminatory effect on women. Id. at 1082 n.3.
43 Id. at 1082, 1083. See notes 37 & 41 and accompanying text supra.
44 465 F.2d at 1082. Extension is generally available as a remedy in the case of beneficial
laws because affording these benefits to males places only a reasonable burden on the employer.
Id. at 1084.But see note 72 infra. Extension of prohibitive laws is generally not possible.See notes
18-19 and accompanying text supra.
The reasoning of the court tends to gloss over the mechanics of how it reached the result of
extending the statute to males. The court merely quoted a passage from the opinion of the
district court for the proposition that extension did not "impede" or "frustrate" the purpose of
the Civil Rights Act. 465 F.2d at 1082.
4 See note 4 and accompanying text supra and text accompanying note 24 supra.
46 Accord, CCH 1968-1973 EEOC Dec. 4428, 4429-30 (1971); CCH 1968-73 EEOC Dec.
4044, 2 F.E.P. Cas. 78, 79 (1969).
47 See General Elec. Co. v. Young, 4 Empl. Prac. Dec. 6233,6237,3 F.E.P. Cas. 560,564-65
(W.D. Ky. 1971); Ridinger v. General Motors Corp., 325 F. Supp. 1089, 1098 (S.D. Ohio 1971);
Rivera v. California Div. of Indus. Welfare, 265 Cal. App. 2d 576,604-05,71 Cal. Rptr. 739,762
(1968); CCH 1968-1973 EEOC Dec. 4629, 4630, 4 F.E.P. Cas. 843 (1972); CCH 1968-1973
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follows that there is no conflict between the statutes such that both
Title VII and beneficial protective laws cannot stand.48
Having concluded that beneficial laws are not pre-empted, the
problem of reverse discrimination arises since females are receiving
greater benefits than similarly situated males. Although this discrimi-
nation is also contrary to the mandate of Title VII, 49 it is not forced
upon the employer. The differential in benefits can be eliminated by
extending the overtime pay to the males.50
EEOC Dec. 4428, 4429-30 (1971); CCH 1968-1973 EEOC Dec. 4044, 2 F.E.P. Gas. 78, 79
(1969); [1972-1976] Ky. Arr'y GEN. Op. 2-132. This test of supremacy clause pre-emption
would seem to be in line with the rule that state and federal laws should be construed if possible
so as to avoid conflicts between them. See note 30 supra.
Butcf. Jones Metal Prods. Co. v. Walker, 29 Ohio St. 2d 173,281 N.E.2d 1 (1972). In Walker,
an employer sought a declaratory judgment that Ohio protective laws requiring seats, lunch-
room facilities, and meal periods for women, and laws limiting hours and prohibiting certain
occupations of women were in conflict with Title VII. The court so held as to the seating,
lunchroom, and meal period laws because they provided privileges to females not accorded to
males. Id. at 178-79, 281 N.E.2d at 6-7. This suggests a supremacy clause pre-emption test in
which the court looks not to what the state law compels but to the discriminatory result of the
law. See also Manning v. General Motors Corp., Empl. Prac. Dec. 7145, 3 F.E.P. Gas. 968 (N.D.
Ohio 1971), affd, 466 F.2d 812 (6th Cir. 1972) (seating law for females held pre-empted by Title
VII); N.M. Att'y Gen. Op. No. 72-22 (1972) (female overtime pay law pre-empted by Title VII).
48 See note 30 supra.
4 See notes 14 & 28 and accompanying text supra.
50 Hays v. Potlatch Forests, Inc., 465 F.2d 1081, 1082 (8th Cir. 1972). Both the district and
circuit courts inHays drew support for their opinions by analogy to § 3 of the Equal Pay Act of
1963, 29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(1) (1970). 318 F. Supp. at 1375; 465 F.2d at 1083. See Rivera v.
California Div. of Indus. Welfare, 265 Cal. App. 2d 576, 605 n.47, 71 Cal. Rptr. 739,762 n.47
(1968).
The Equal Pay Act provides in pertinent part:
No employer... shall discriminate... between employees on the basis of sex by paying
wages to employees... at a rate less than the rate at which he pays wages to employees
of the opposite sex.., for equal work... except where such payment is made pursuant
to . . . a differential based on any other factor other than sex: Provided, That an
employer who is paying a wage rate differential in violation of this subsection shall not,
in order to comply with the provisions of this subsection, reduce the wage rate of any
employee.
29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(1)(1970). This provision amends the Federal Fair Labor Standards Act of
1938, which also provides:
No provision of this chapter or of any order thereunder shall excuse noncom-
pliance with any Federal or State law or municipal ordinance establishing a minimum
wage higher than the minimum wage established under this chapter or a maximum
workweek lower than the maximum workweek established under this chapter....
Id. § 218.
The Wage and Hour Division of the Department of Labor has interpreted § 3 of the Equal
Pay Act as requiring an employer paying women minimum wages and overtime pursuant to
state protective laws to pay the higher wage rate to male employees. 29 C.F.R. §§ 800.160,.163
(1972).
Although the administration of the Equal Pay Act of 1963 presents an issue similar to that
involved in the debate over extension of beneficial protective laws and is of persuasive value (cf.
Ammons v. Zia Co., 448 F.2d 117, 119-20 (10th Cir. 1971); Shultz v. Wheaton Glass Co., 421
F.2d 259, 266 (10th Cir. 1970),cert. denied, 398 U.S. 905 (1970); Hodgson v. Brookhaven Gen'l
Hosp., 436 F.2d 719,727 (5th Cir. 1970)), the problem with the analogy is that in drafting Title
VII Congress did not express an intent, like that in the Equal Pay Act, to raise wages when
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The EEOC has taken a strong position in favor of extension in its
recently amended Guidelines on Discrimination Because of Sex.5' In
Griggs v. Duke Power Co.,52 the Supreme Court held that EEOC
Guidelines are entitled to "great deference .... [S]ince the [Civil
Rights] Act and its legislative history support the Commission's con-
struction. '53 Griggs, however, was decided in the context of racial
discrimination, 54 and the legislative history of the addition of the
"sex" prohibition to Tide VII, unlike that of the "race" prohibition,
affords little help in interpreting the Act.5 5 Nevertheless, the "great
deference" wording of the Court lends weight to the extension
approach. 56
differentials in pay are found to exist. Nor is the analogy appropriate when discussing other
beneficial protective laws such as rest breaks, lunch periods, or seating laws.
"' (3) A number of States require that minimum wage and premium pay for overtime
be provided for female employees. An employer will be deemed to have engaged in an
unlawful employment practice if:
(i) It refuses to hire or otherwise adversely affects the employment oppor-
tunities of female applicants or employees in order to avoid the payment of minimum
wages or overtime pay required by State law; or
(ii) It does not provide the same benefits for male employees.
(4) As to other kinds of sex-oriented State employment laws, such as those requir-
ing special rest and meal periods or physical facilities for women, provision of these
benefits to one sex only will be a violation of title VII. An employer will be deemed to
have engaged in an unlawful employment practice if:
(i) It refuses to hire or otherwise adversely affects the employment oppor-
tunities of female applicants or employees in order to avoid the provision of such
benefits; or
(ii) It does not provide the same benefits for male employees. If the employer can
prove that business necessity precludes providing these benefits to both men and
women, then the State law is in conflict with and superseded by title VII as to this
employer. In this situation, the employer shall not provide such benefits to members of
either sex.
37 Fed. Reg. 6835-36 (1972) (emphasis added). These revised Guidelines became effective
April 5, 1972. The original Guidelines adopted by the EEOC in November 1965 were first
amended in February 1968. 30 Fed. Reg. 14,926-27 (1965); 33 Fed. Reg. 3344 (1968).
Although the extension approach has only recently been adopted in the form of a regula-
tion, the EEOC foreshadowed its position as long ago as 1966. EEOC, supra note 22, at 24. See
CCH 1968-1973 EEOC Dec. 4629,4630,4 F.E.P. Cas. 843 (1972); CCH 1968-1973 EEOC Dec.
4428, 4429-30 (1971); CCH 1968-1973 EEOC Dec. 4044, 2 F.E.P. Cas. 78 (1969).
For a discussion and cases presenting issues arising out of application of the "business
necessity" test of the Guidelines, see note 72 infra.
52 401 U.S. 424 (1971). Griggs dealt with the EEOC's Guidelines on Employment Testing
Procedures.
" Id. at 434; accord, Phillips v. Martin Marietta Corp., 400 U.S. 542,545 (1971) (Marshall,
J., concurring); Weeks v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 408 F.2d 228, 235 (5th Cir. 1969); see
Udall v. Tallman, 380 U.S. 1, 16 (1965). Technically, however, a court is free to interpret the law
differently in any case that presents an issue similar to those addressed in the Guidelines.
American Newspaper Publishers Ass'n v. Alexander, 294 F. Supp. 1100, 1103 (D.D.C. 1968),
stay vacated, 1 Empl. Prac. Dec. 1416, 1 F.E.P. Cas. 703 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
54 401 U.S. at 426-28.
See note lOsupra.
Following the Griggs opinion one federal district court stated:
In sustaining the EEOC's application of the statutory interpretation, it is not necessary
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C. Precedent Against Extension
The recent case of Burns v. Rohr Corp.57 was the first squarely to
confront and reject the extension argument. In Burns, the employer
had adopted a policy pursuant to a regulation of the California
Industrial Welfare Commission granting all female employees a for-
mal ten-minute rest break every four hours.58 A recently discharged
male employee instituted suit alleging discriminatory employment
practices in the employer's failure to afford males similar rest-break
privileges. The employee drew the distinction between prohibitive
and beneficial protective legislation and contended, as had the de-
fendant in Hays,5 9 that the pre-emption issue should not be reached
by the court because equal treatment between the sexes could be
attained by extending the rest-break privilege to men. 60
In rejecting the employee's argument, the federal district court
formulated a supremacy clause test of pre-emption based upon the
principle that "[t]he basic objective of Title VII is to cause employ-
ment to be based only upon applicable job qualifications."'6' Finding
the state regulation in conflict with this principle and thus pre-
empted, the court reasoned:
[T]he regulation challenged here has, as its major premise, the
same premise as regulations restricting the number of hours that
women may work or the amount of weight that they are allowed to
lift; viz., women as a class are inherently weaker physically than
fobr this Court to hold that the conclusion reached is the only reasonable one, or even
that it is the one this court would have reached if it initially had decided the matter de
novo.
Manning v. General Motors Corp., 3 Empl. Prac. Dec. 7145, 7151, 3 F.E.P. Cas 968, 974 (N.D.
Ohio 1971); see Unemployment Comm'n v. Aragon, 329 U.S. 143, 153 (1946).
5 346 F. Supp. 994 (S.D. Cal. 1972).
58 Id. at 995. The regulation provides:
11180. Order Governing Wages, Hours, and Working Conditions for Women
and Minors in the Manufacturing Industry. 1. Applicability of Order. This Order
shall apply to all women and minors employed in the manufacturing industry whether
paid on a time, piece rate, commission, or other basis, except that the provisions of
Sections 3 through 12 shall notapply to women employed in administrative, executive,
or professional capacities.
12. Rest Periods. Every employer shall authorize and permit all employees to
take rest periods which, insofar as practicable, shall be in the middle of each work
period. The authorized rest period time shall be based on the total hours worked daily
at the rate often (10) minutes per four (4) hours or major fraction thereof. However, a
rest period need not be authorized for employees whose total daily work time is less
than three and one-half (3 ) hours. Authorized rest period time shall be counted as
hours worked for which there shall be no deduction from wages.
8 CAL. ADMIN. CODE § 11180 (Order No. 1-68, eff. Feb. 1, 1968).
'9 Hays v. Potlatch Forests, Inc., 465 F.2d 1081 (8th Cir. 1972).
60 346 F. Supp. at 997.
61 Id.
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men. Without more, case law which binds this Court makes it dear
that the rest-break regulation involved herein runs contrary to the
objectives of Title VII.62
This rationale recognizes that in formulating the protective regu-
lation the state agency had in mind what it believed to be a rational
basis for the distinction between male and female employees, i.e., that
women are the weaker sex. Since this basis of classification is now
discredited, it would seem anomalous to allow the regulation to stand,
and indeed, to extend it to embrace a larger class.6 3
Extension of benefits to male employees without any determina-
tion of their need for such benefits may find little underpinning in the
normally broad powers of a state to regulate employment practices in
the business-labor field.6 4 If the benefits of the protective laws are
being extended to males merely in the name of equality between the
sexes, 65 and not as suitable protection of the health, safety, or welfare
6' Id. at 998. Similar statements can be found in other cases. See, e.g., Weeks v. Southern
Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 408 F.2d 228, 236 (5th Cir. 1969):
Title VII rejects... this type of romantic paternalism as unduly Victorian and instead
vests individual women with the power to decide whether or not to take on unromantic
tasks. Men have always had the right to determine whether the incremental increase in
remuneration for strenuous, dangerous, obnoxious, boring unromantic tasks is worth
the candle. The promise of Title VII is that women are now to be on equal footing.
See also Manning v. General Motors Corp., 3 Empl. Prac. Dec. 7145, 7140, 3 F.E.P. Cas. 968,973
(N.D. Ohio 1971):
The upshot of the "protective" laws is the exclusion of women from certain positions
on a generic basis, by stating that they are not physically or biologically suited for such
employment. Apparently, this is a carryover of the stereotype that females are the
weaker sex. Such employment practices constitute a violation of Title VII ....
6' In Burns, the district court failed to adopt the extension approach despite urging by the
EEOC as amicus curiae (346 F. Supp. at 998) thus implicitly declining to afford "great defer-
ence" to the EEOC interpretation pursuant to Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
See notes 51-56 and accompanying text supra.
The paradoxical result of the recent revision of the EEOC Guidelines (see note 51 supra ) is
that earlier cases striking down beneficial protective laws have done so citing the previous
Guidelines as authority. Manning v. General Motors Corp., 3 Empl. Prac. Dec. 7145, 3 F.E.P.
Cas. 968 (N.D. Ohio 1971) (striking down seating laws that EEOC has decreed preserved in its
amended Guidelines (37 Fed. Reg. 6835, 6836 (1972)); Jones Metal Prods. Co. v. Walker, 29
Ohio St. 2d 173, 281 N.E.2d 1 (1972) (striking down rest period, lunch break, and seating laws
saved by the EEOC in its amended Guidelines (37 Fed. Reg. 6835, 6836 (1972)); N.M. Att'y Gen.
Op. No. 72-22 (1972) (overtime law applicable only to women pre-empted; preserved by EEOC
in amended Guidelines (37 Fed. Reg. 6835, 6836 (1972)). The new Guidelines now urge
extension in circumstances in which these earlier opinions opted for pre-emption, and em-
ployers now decide whether to adhere to the case law or the revised EEOC Guidelines.
6 See,e.g., Day-Brite Lighting, Inc. v. Missouri, 342 U.S. 421, 423 (1952); Carpenters Local
213 v. Ritter's Cafe, 315 U.S. 722, 728 (1942); West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379,
393-94 (1937).
65 Of course, there is more than just equality underlying the motives of proponents of the
extension argument, for equality could be achieved by invalidating the beneficial protective
legislation and thus lowering the employment benefits of females to the level of benefits
accorded to males. The attractiveness of the extension remedy is that it allows females to retain
1973]
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of male employees, then an employer has a cogent argument that
such an extension is an unconstitutional exercise of the police power.
The interaction between the police power of the state and the due
process clause of the federal constitution demands not only that
legislation be neither arbitrary nor capricious, but also "that the
means selected shall have a real and substantial relation to the object
sought to be attained. '6 6 The principle object sought through selec-
tive pre-emption is the retention of the benefits of protective laws for
women while still achieving equal footing with males in the labor
market. Although equality is a laudable goal, it is unreasonable to
achieve it by forcing employers to provide expensive and unnecessary
physical facilities or privileges to male employees. 67 Thus, if a state
legislature could not satisfy due process requirements by justifying a
statute affording the benefits of a female protective statute to males
on grounds other than the need of male employees for such statutory
protection, it is difficult to see how the same result can constitutionally
be achieved when federal legislation, by virtue of the supremacy
clause, utilizes a state statute or regulation to confer the same benefits
on the identical class of male employees.68
The extension approach was rejected in Burns for two additional
reasons. First, the court expressed the opinion that the extension
remedy "would amount to usurpation of the legislative power that has
been vested exclusively in the state legislature."6 9 The court correctly
noted that extension would" 'amend' the state's labor laws,'170 but the
extension approach would confer benefits on males only as an addi-
tional federal duty imposed on employers covered by Title VII. It
would not involve judicial legislation. 71
the benefits of the protective laws while still achieving equality. This became a valuable selling
point during the debate over the Equal Rights Amendment. See notes 82-83 and accompanying
text infra.
66 Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502, 525 (1934).
67 The facts ofBurns illustrate that a blind application ofthe extension approach could lead
to unreasonable results. Male employees were already receiving unsupervised break time,
although not the formal ten-minute rest breaks every four hours that the regulation required.
346 F. Supp. at 995-96, 998. There was, therefore, no need for extension of the beneficial
regulation in order to cure a "social ill."
66 This reasoning suggests that two constitutional hurdles must be faced before a protec-
tive labor law will be extended to males. First, under the supremacy clause only beneficial
protective laws escape pre-emption. See notes 24-25 & 45-50 and accompanying text supra.
Second, is the substantive due process argument based on the unreasonableness of imposing
additional burdens on employers through the extension of beneficial protective laws when such
extension is not to safeguard the health, safety, or welfare of male employees, but rather is to
erase discriminatory employment practices while preserving for females the benefits of protec-
tive legislation.
69 346 F. Supp. at 997.
70 Id.
71 See Brown, Emerson, Falk & Freeman, supra note 3, at 926, n.107.
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The second objection raised by the court was that extension
would create competitive disadvantages between employers of all
males and employers of a mixed labor force.7 2 In highly competitive
industries, this could result in the attempted discharge by employers
of female employees in order to reduce costs. The court also rejected
the alternative of limiting an extension remedy to the particular facts
of the case because that approach would be likely to cause enforce-
ment problems for the state and confusion among employers as to the
applicability of the regulation.7 3
II
A LOOK AT WHAT Is AHEAD: THE EQUAL RIGHTS AMENDMENT
The proposed Equal Rights Amendment, passed by Congress on
March 22, 1972,74 is presently before the state legislatures for
72 346 F. Supp. at 997. An analogous problem arises when the mode of operation or
business requirements of an employer makes extension of beneficial protective legislation to
males either impossible or extremely difficult. In Steelworkers Local 1104 v. United States Steel
Corp., 4 Empl. Prac. Dec. 6328, 4 F.E.P. Cas. 1103 (N.D. Ohio 1972), affd, 5 Empl. Prac. Dec.
7974, 5 F.E.P. Cas. 1121 (6th Cir. 1973), the nature of the employer's industry required that
some of the employees remain "on-call" at all times in the eventof an emergency thus necessitat-
ing that lunches be eaten at work stations. Pursuant to a protective law prohibiting the employ-
ment of a female for a period of more than five hours of continuous labor unless such period is
broken by a one-half hour meal period, the employer kept only male employees on the "on-call"
status while affording females a guaranteed uninterrupted lunch period. Since the males were
subject to demand based on the day's work requirements, they were paid fora full eight hours of
each scheduled eight hour shift; females were paid for only seven and one-half hours. The court
recognized that the necessary continuous operation of the employer's plant precluded the
extension of the one-half hour lunch break to men. Furthermore, in the face of a suit by females
seeking back wages, the court concluded that to have paid the females for eight hours while
continuing to provide them a guaranteed uninterrupted meal period, would have been "vul-
nerable to reverse discrimination claims by male employees." Id. at 6341-42, 4 F.E.P. Gas. at
1117.
In General Elec. Co. v. Young, 4 Empl. Prac. Dec. 6233,3 F.E.P. Gas. 560 (W.D. Ky. 1971),
two employers sought a determination that protective statutes limiting the hours of female
workers had been pre-empted by Title VII. Because the plant operations frequently required
the scheduling of work hours in excess of the limits imposed by the state laws, the overtime
hours were being assigned solely to males. The court agreed that this differential in the
treatment of male and female employees "compel[led] an employer to make a prohibited
classification of employees on the basis of a stereotyped characterization of the sexes in violation
of Title VII." Id. at 6237, 3 F.E.P. Gas. at 565. However, the court never considered the
possibility of extending the benefits of the rest-period statute to males.
In those situations in which the mode of an employer's operation precludes the extension of
beneficial protective laws to males, the EEOC has adopted a "business necessity" test which
places the burden upon the employer to prove the impropriety of extension. See 37 Fed. Reg.
6835, 6836 (1972); note 51 supra. No hintis given as to whether the employer mustestablish that
extension is possible or merely that its implementation would be an onerous burden. In the
event of a showing of business necessity the beneficial protective law is superseded by Title VII
as to that employer, and the benefits may not be provided to members of either sex.
73 But cf Rosenfeld v. Southern Pac. Co., 444 F.2d 1219, 1227 (9th Cir. 1971).
74 H.R.J. Res. 208, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. (1972). For an excellent short summary of the
circuitous legislation path of the amendment, see EQUAL RIGHTS FOR MEN AND WOMEN, S. REP.
CORNELL LAW REVIEW
ratification.7 5 The proposed Amendment provides:
Section 1. Equality of rights under the law shall not be de-
nied or abridged by the United States or by any State on account of
sex.
Section 2. The Congress shall have the power to enforce, by
appropriate legislation, the provisions of this article.
Section 3. This amendment shall take effect two years after
the date of ratification.
The Amendment has its genesis in the principle that sex should not be
a determining factor by which a government affects the legal rights of
its citizens.76 Only governmental action is constrained; private actions
and relationships are unaffected. 7
Resistance to the Equal Rights Amendment has been generated
by the fear that the Amendment will become a vehicle for invalidating
hard-won protective labor legislation for women. 78 This is a some-
what belated argument since significant inroads have already been
made on prohibitive protective laws under Title VII and state fair
employment laws. 79 Judicial interpretation of the Equal Rights
Amendment regarding prohibitive protective statutes is expected to
follow the lead of the Title VII cases.8 °
The more troublesome problem is how courts will reconcile the
Equal Rights Amendment with state beneficial protective laws. The
resolution of this question is significant because the Amendment,
unlike Title VII, will affect all employer-employee relationships cov-
ered by state protective statutes.8 ' In an effort to dispel opposition to
the Amendment and in recognition of the desirability of preserving
No. 689, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 4-6 (1972) [hereinafter cited as SENATE REPORT].
75 Approval by 38 states is required to make the joint resolution our 27th amendment. As
of this date 30 states have ratified the Amendment. Nebraska, however, is attempting to rescind
its ratification, and a constitutional battle over its ability to do so is brewing.
71 See SENATE REPORT 11-12; U.S. CITIzENs' ADVISORY COUNCIL ON THE STATUS OF WOMEN,
A MEMORANDUM ON THE PROPOSED EQUAL RIGHTS AMENDMENT TO THE UNITED STATES
CONSTITUTION 1 (1970) [hereinafter cited as MEMORANDUM].
7' See SENATE REPORT 2. It is in the private sector that the most serious discrimination
against women occurs. See Committee on Federal Legislation, Amending the Constitution To
Prohibit State Discrimination Based on Sex, 26 RECORD OF N.Y.C.B.A. 77, 78 (1971); Freund, The
EqualRightsAmendment Is Not the Way, 6 HARV. CIV. RIGHTS-CIV. LIB. L. Rv. 234,236-37 (1971).
78 SENATE REPORT 42-44 (minority views); Hearings 48-51, 57, 62 (testimony of M. Wolf-
gang, Vice-President, Hotel and Restaurant Employees Union).
'9 SENATE REPORT 14-15; Hearings 69 (testimony of M. Wolfgang, Vice-President, Hotel
and Restaurant Employees Union); U.S. PRESIDENT'S TASK FORCE ON WOMEN'S RIGHTS AND
RESPONSIBILITIES, REPORT: A MATTER OF SIMPLE JUSTICE 5 (1970); MEMORANDUM 15.
s Brown, Emerson, Falk & Freeman,supra note 3 at 928;see sources cited in note 79supra.
For the currentjudicial treatment of prohibitive protective legislation under Title VII, see cases
cited in note 25 and accompanying text supra.
81 See note 9supra.
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beneficial protective laws for women, the Amendment's proponents
have supported the extension approach, claiming that it would aid,
not only in retaining the state laws for women,82 but also in conferring
their benefits on the male workforce.8 3 Opponents of the Amend-
ment fear that it will automatically render unconstitutional all statutes
treating women differently from men.84
Conflicting statements made by proponents of the Equal Rights
Amendment have left congressional intent less clearly defined than
the courts might otherwise prefer.8 5 Although no one can predict
82 See Hearings 168-74 (testimony of L. Kanowitz, Professor, University of New Mexico
School of Law).
Not only has the Labor Department, in administering the Equal Pay Act, entitles [sic]
men ... to the same minimum wage if they are covered by the Federal law, but the
EEOC, also has taken the position that the benefits of State laws, presently applicable to
women only ... are required by title VII to be extended to men. Even in those situations
that are beyond the jurisdictional reach of title VII and the Equal Pay Act .... the
judicial extension technique employed in equal protection and other constitutional
cases, could lead to the same results.
Moreover, these results can also be achieved under the proposed equal rights
amendment--especially if the legislative history discloses that Congress intends this.
The fears of some opponents of the amendment that its adoption would nullify laws
that presently protect women only are thus unfounded-since the equality of treat-
ment required by the amendment can be achieved by extending the benefits of those
laws to men rather than by removing them from women.
Id. at 170-71 (testimony of L. Kanowitz, Professor, University of New Mexico School of Law);
accord, SENATE REPORT 15-16; MEMORANDUM 11-12, 15; U.S. CITIZENS' ADVISORY COUNCIL )N
THE STATUS OF WOMEN, WOMEN IN 1970, at 18 (1971); Brown, Emerson, Falk & Freeman,supra
note 3, at 912-20, 927; Dorsen & Ross, The Necessity ofa ConstitutionalAmendment, 6 HARV. CIV.
RIGHTS-CIv. LIB. L. REv. 216, 220-21 (1971).
83 [TJhe current renewed concern with the legal status ofwomen will in niany respects
result in improving the situation of men as well as women.Just as breakthroughs in the
legal status of American blacks has [sic] benefited other racial and ethnic "minorities,"
so the effort to provide women with equal employment opportunity can substantially
improve the situation of male employees in industry and commerce.
Kanowitz, Women and the Law: A Reply to Some of the Commentators, 4 FAMILY L..Q. 19, 29 (1970).
84 SENATE REPORT 27,33-35,42-44 (minority views);Hearings 85 (remarks of Senator Ervin
and P. Freund, Professor, Harvard University School of Law); Rawalt, Congressional Treatment of
the Proposed Equal Rights Amendment, 57 WOMEN LAW. J. 19, 20 (1971) (quoting AFL-CIO
spokesmen).
85 Proponents of the Amendment are in considerable disagreement as to when the exten-
sion remedy should be utilized. For example, Professor Kanowitz urges that the maximum
hours and weight lifting protective laws be extended to men:
[T]he path chosen by the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) and
most plaintiffs in sex-discrimination cases has been aimed at seeking the invalidation of
such state protective laws.... My own view is essentially that, with victories like these,
women don't need many defeats. For success in these efforts not only removes limita-
tions upon women's right to work extra hours or lift extra weights, but also means that
those women who do not wish to lift heavy weights or do not wish to work excessive
hours-and I would suggest that they are many if not in the majority--can henceforth
be forced to do so.
Kanowitz, supra note 83, at 28. See Hearings 172-77.
Diametrically opposed to this interpretation of the operation of the Amendment is the
position of the Citizens' Advisory Council that weight-lifting laws and maximum-hours laws will
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with confidence the impact of the Amendment on beneficial protec-
tive laws, the final report on the Amendment opts for some applica-
tion of the extension remedy.86
A. Selective Extension Under the Equal Rights Amendment
The extension remedy would operate in a wholly different man-
ner under the Equal Rights Amendment than under Title VII. In
Title VII cases, protective laws are either pre-empted by virtue of the
supremacy clause or extended as an additional duty imposed upon
employers by federal law. 87 The Equal Rights Amendment, however,
would operate directly upon a state protective law which classified on
the basis of sex invalidating the law in toto, saving part of the statutory
scheme by excision of constitutionally offensive parts, or undertaking
majorjudicial surgery by extending the benefits of the statute to both
male and female employees, even though the state legislature did not
intend to benefit males. 88
not be extended by the Amendment, but rather they will be rendered unconstitutional by it.
MEMORANDUM 12.
A similar ambiguity has crept into the final Senate report in support of the proposed
Amendment. First, weight-lifting laws are categorized as discriminatory rather than protective,
and thus they will be invalidated under the proposed amendment. SENATE REPORT 14-15. The
case of Bowe v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 416 F.2d 711 (7th Cir. 1969), which extended a
weight-lifting limitation to men, is then cited in support of the extension remedy. SENATE
REPORT 16.
One additional uncertainty merits discussion. The Senate Report makes the unqualified
statement that such beneficial protective provisions as rest periods and meal periods will be
extended to men.Id. However, the EEOC in its recently revised Guidelines has recognized that
in some cases business necessity militates against extension of certain protective laws. See note 72
supra. Whether the Equal Rights Amendment requires a similar business necessity test remains
open to question. Such a test cannot, however, be found in the language of the proposed
Amendment. See text accompanying notes 75-76 supra; note 51 supra.
86 SENATE REPORT 14-16. Since the courts are inclined to give significant weight to the views
expressed by the proponents of the Amendment in its final form, it is probable that some form
of extension will be adopted as ajudicial remedy. The unlikelihood that all protective laws will
withstand the scrutiny of the Equal Rights Amendment is further supported by the many
amendments rejected by the Senate before passage of the joint resolution in its present form.
See, e.g., H.R.J. Res. 208, Amdt. No. 1067, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. (1972).
87 See note 71 and accompanying text supra.
88 See Brown, Emerson, Falk & Freeman, supra note 3, at 913; note 89 infra. Generally, a
court will try to ascertain whether the state legislature would prefer to have an underinclusive
(the word was coined by Mr.Justice Harlan in Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333,361 (1970),
apparently as a shorthand antonym for overbreadth) statute remain in effect on an equalized
basis or, if the purpose of the statute is fundamentally defeated, to have it fall in its entirety. See
Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333,355-56 (1970) (Harlan,J., concurring); Champlin Ref. Co.
v. Corporation Comm'n, 286 U.S. 210, 234 (1932); Hearings 81; Brown, Emerson, Falk &
Freeman,supra note 3, at 920. To the extent that legislative intent is lacking, the following rules
of construction have been suggested in determining when a court will extend an underinclusive
statute to circumscribe a larger class: (1) if the statute deals with a subjectof major significance, a
saving construction is generally preferred (see Welsh v. United States, supra at 366-67 (Harlan,
J., concurring); Brown, Emerson, Falk & Freeman,supra note 3, at 914); (2) it must be feasible to
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It is somewhat doubtful that the judiciary has the power to
extend the benefits of a protective law to males by force of a constitu-
tional provision for the mere purpose of equalizing employment
practices.8 9 Nevertheless, the prospect of passage and ratification of
the Equal Rights Amendment has spurred a few commentators to
search for supporting authority. 90 Most frequently cited has been
Levy v. Louisiana9' in which the Supreme Court held that a statute
permitting an action by legitimate children for the wrongful death of
their mother, but which was construed by the state court to deny
illegitimates the right to bring such an action, was in contravention of
the equal protection clause.92 Instead of invalidating the statute, the
Court implicitly extended the statutory wrongful death action to
illegitimates. More recently, in Shapiro v. Thompson,93 the Supreme
Court found that a state law which predicated the right to receive
welfare payments upon a lengthy residency requirement unconstitu-
tionally inhibited the freedom to travel. 94 Again, the right to receive
the payments was implicitly extended to the excluded class.
extend the statute to the larger perimeters of a new class (see Brown, Emerson, Falk & Freeman,
supra note 3, at 914: for a discussion of the feasibility of extending prohibitive and beneficial
protective legislation, see notes 18-19 and accompanying textsupra and note 44supra); (3) if the
statutory scheme is sufficiently disrupted after excision, the court will be inclined to invalidate it
entirely (see Welsh v. United States,supra at 365 (Harlan,J., concurring)); (4) a court will be more
inclined to expand the class if the number to be added is not proportionally at variance with the
original composition of the class (see Brown, Emerson, Falk & Freeman,supra note 3, at 914-15);
(5) in deference to the maxim that criminal laws are to be strictly construed, courts are less
inclined to expand the coverage of a criminal statute (see id. at 915, 920. The violation of
protective laws generally carries criminal monetary fines. See, e.g., ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 48, § 6
(Smith-Hurd 1969)); (6) a saving construction is more likely when the effect is to confer a benefit
on a class (see Welsh v. United States, supra at 366 n.18 (Harlan, J., concurring); Brown,
Emerson, Falk & Freeman,supra note 3, at 9.16-17); and, finally (7)judicial modesty and a desire
to avoid the appearance ofjudicial legislating incline courts to excise words from a statute more
readily than to add language (see Bastardo v. Warren 4 Empl. Prac. Dec. 5500,5501 (W.D. Wis.
1970); Hearings 82; Brown, Emerson, Falk & Freeman, supra note 3, at 917).
" Perhaps the frankest articulation ofthe power of courts to adopt the extension approach
in proper circumstances is found in Mr.Justice Harlan's concurring opinion in Welsh v. United
States, 398 U.S. 333, 361 (1970):
Where a statute is defective because of underinclusion there exist two remedial
alternatives: a court may either declare it a nullity and order that its benefits not extend
to the class that the legislature intended to benefit, or it may extend the coverage of the
statute to include those who are aggrieved by exclusion.
It is significant that the Court was unwillingat that time to adopt the path ofstatutory rebuilding
advocated by Mr. Justice Harlan.
9' See L. KANOWITZ, supra note 3, at 186-96; Brown, Emerson, Falk & Freeman,supra note
3, at 918-20; Dorsen & Ross, supra note 82, at 221.
91 391 U.S. 68 (1968). See SENATE REPORT 16; L. KANOwrrz, supra note 3, at 159, 186;
Brown, Emerson, Falk & Freeman, stipra note 3, at 919.
92 391 U.S. at 71-72.
93 394 U.S. 618 (1969).
91 Id. at 629-34, 642.
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Following ratification of the fifteenth and nineteenth amend-
ments, the Supreme Court held that they should not be read as
invalidating state voting laws that excluded blacks and women.
Rather than adopt the invalidation approach, which would have
temporarily left many of the states without a voting law, the Court
construed the amendments to be self-executing, operating directly on
state laws and enlarging their scope to embrace the newly en-
franchised. 95 Similar judicial molding of statutory classifications
which discriminated on the basis of sex has taken place when women
were excused from jury duty, 96 when females were excluded from
admission to a state supported university, 97 when longer prison terms
for the same offense were given to women,98 and when unwed fathers
were denied a hearing on their fitness for child custody. 99
In each of the cases mentioned above the courts either were
contracting the class to which the statute was applicable in order to
afford women equal protection of the laws or were expanding the
class to include the party aggrieved by exclusion only when funda-
mental civil rights were involved. 100 Following this line of reasoning,
it would seem that only males would have standing to challenge
beneficial protective laws under the Equal Rights Amendment be-
cause only they are arguably aggrieved byexclusion from the favored
class. 10 1 This would be a surprising result since the Amendments
purpose is to assist females. Moreover, the cases cited in support of
extension are not in point for another reason. State protective legisla-
9 See Breedlove v. Suttles, 302 U.S. 277, 283 (1937); Leser v. Garnett, 258 U.S. 130, 136
(1922); Guinn v. United States, 238 U.S. 347,362-63 (1915); Myers v. Anderson, 238 U.S. 368,
382 (1915); Neal v. Delaware, 103 U.S. 370, 389 (1880).
In Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629 (1950) and McLaurin v. Oklahoma State Regents, 339
U.S. 637 (1950), state laws prohibiting or restricting the admission of blacks to state supported
universities were struck down under the equal protection clause, and the right to attend the
institutions on an equal basis with whites was extended to black students. This construction by
the Court was facilitated by the language of state voting laws which permitted a simple excision
of the "white" or "male" qualification. See Leser v. Garnett, 258 U.S. 130, 135-36 (1922); Myers
v. Anderson 238 U.S. 368, 382 (1915); Neal v. Delaware, 103 U.S. 370, 390 (1880).
9' White v. Crook, 251 F. Supp. 401, 408-09 (M.D. Ala. 1966).
" Kirstein v. Rector & Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 309 F. Supp. 184, 187-89 (E.D. Va.
1970).
98 United Statesexrel. Robinson v. York, 281 F. Supp. 8, 14-16 (D. Conn. 1968); Common-
wealth v. Daniel, 430 Pa. 642, 650, 243 A.2d 400, 404 (1968).
99 Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 658 (1972).
'0' Consider the following language in Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68, 71 (1968):
In applying the Equal Protection Clause to social and economic legislation, we give
great latitude to the legislature in making classifications.... However that mightbe, we
have been extremely sensitive when it comes to basic civil rights ... and have not
hesitated to strike down an invidious classification even though it had history and
tradition on its side. . . .The rights asserted here involve the intimate, familial
relationship between a child and his own mother.
"I See Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333, 361 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring).
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tion cannot be aptly characterized as affecting basic civil rights, e.g.,
right to vote, freedom to travel, or interfamilial relationships, since
the states have long been given broad powers to classify in the
business-labor field.1
0 2
B. The Major Objection to Extension: Division of Powers
Because extension is ajudicial rather than a legislative develop-
ment, the major objection to extension by force of the Equal Rights
Amendment is the issue of separation of powers. In Bastardo v.
Warren,10 3 a male farm worker sought a declaratory judgment that a
state minimum wage law, 10 4 applicable only to women and minors,
denied him due process and equal protection of the laws. The plain-
tiff sought to enjoin the state from denying him the protection of the
minimum wage law, even though the statute did not mention
males.' 0 5
In determining that an injunction was not an available remedy,
the court reasoned that if the state legislature had known that it could
not constitutionally afford the protection of a minimum wage to
women only, it might well have determined that the law would be too
burdensome for employers and would not have enacted it. The court
concluded that the weighing of the interests of employers and em-
ployees was a legislative and not a judicial function.' 0 6
CONCLUSION
Selective extension is an adroit means of retaining state beneficial
protective legislation for women while achieving sexual equality
12 See cases cited in note 64supra.
1"' 4 Empl. Prac. Dec. 5500 (W.D. Wis. 1970).
104 See Wis. STAT. ANN. § 104.02 (1957).
I's 4 Empl. Prac. Dec. at 5501; cf. West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379,400 (1937)
(rejecting argument that minimum wage law applicable only to women and minors constituted
arbitrary discrimination because same benefits not extended to men).
106 4 Empl. Prac. Dec. at 5503. The language of the court is revealing:
The relief plaintiffs seek is not really that defendants cease excluding men from
the protection of [the minimum wage law], although this is how plaintiffs wish to state
the issue; plaintiffs actually seek to compel defendants to take affirmative action to
extend the protection of [the minimum wage law] to men, although men are not
named in the statute. Such relief cannot be judicially molded.... It may be that the
Wisconsin Legislature would not have enacted [the minimum wage law], had it known
that the section would be construed to protect men as well as women and minors. For
example, a legislature might weigh the interests of employers, on the one hand, and
female and minor employees, on the other, and decide that any adverse effects
imposed on employers by a minimum wage law are offset by the benefits accruing to
women and children. But if such a law could not constitutionally fail to include adult
males, a legislature might decide that it is better to have no minimum wage law at all.
Such a decision should be left to the legislature.
But see L. KANowrrz, supra note 3, at 123-24.
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under the sweeping egalitarian mandates of Title VII and the pro-
posed Equal Rights Amendment.1 7 Despite the problems that such
an approach might yield, it is apparent that Congress has left to the
judiciary the task of working out many of the details of achieving
sexual equality by either invalidating or extending protective laws.
The courts will be called upon to make difficult policy determinations
that either affect the health and safety of large numbers of the
working class or dip into the employer's pocket. l08 Although the
courts are the proper forum for balancing fundamental rights, the
social and economic judgments behind occupational health and
safety labor laws are best left to the legislative branch.
One avenue remains for the courts to avoid being the final
appraisers of the numerous state protective laws. If the Equal Rights
Amendment is ratified, two years will remain before its effective
date. 0 9 State legislators should utilize this period of grace to review
107 One commentator termed selective pre-emption a "have your cake and eat it too"
approach. Hearings 31 (statement of M. Wolfgang, Vice-President, Hotel and Restaurant
Employees Union).
108 If anything about this proposed amendment is clear, it is that it would transform
every provision of law concerning women into a constitutional issue to be ultimately
resolved by the Supreme Court of the United States. Every statutory and common law
provision dealing with the manifold relation of women in society would be forced to
run the gauntlet of attack on constitutional grounds. The range of such potential
litigation is too great to be readily foreseen ....
[T]he fate of all this varied legislation could be left highly uncertain in the face of
judicial review.
SENATE REPORT 34 (statement of P. Freund, Professor, Harvard University School of Law).
109 Congress has already taken a step in this direction by the establishment of a com-
prehensive statutory and regulatory scheme to safeguard both male and female employees. See
Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970, 29 U.S.C. §§ 651-78 (1970). The Act expressly
provides for states to assume the duties of enforcement and administration under similar state
laws. Id. §§ 667, 672.
On May 14, 1973, inFrontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, a plurality of the Supreme Court
for the first time applied the "inherently suspect" test to a statutory classification based on sex.
The plaintiff in Frontiero was a married woman Air Force officer who sought increased allow-
ances for quarters, medical, and dental expenses claiming that her husband was a "dependent"
under 10 U.S.C. §§ 1072, 1076 (1970) and 37 U.S.C. §§ 401,403 (1970). Thosestatutes provided
that spouses of male members of the armed forces are dependents for purposes of obtaining the
increased benefits, but that a female member is required to demonstrate that her spouse does
not provide more than one-half of her support. Reversing the decision below, the Court held
the statutes discriminatory in violation of the due process clause of the fifth amendment.
Frontiero, in hinting that sex-based classifications are inherently suspect, provides a poten-
tial means of achieving the same end result as the Equal Rights Amendment. In Frontiero, the
Court strayed from previous jurisprudence by striking down a sex-based classification even
though fundamental civil rights were not involved (cf. notes 100-02 and accompanying text
supra). However, Frontiero does not break new ground on the question of whether laws which
benefit only one sex should be extended rather than invalidated. As Mr. Justice Brennan,
writing for the plurality was careful to note (411 U.S. at 691 n. 25), the Court was able to extend
to the plaintiff the increased benefits she desired by excision from the statutory scheme only
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and revise protective statutes and regulations so that they will pass
constitutional muster.
Carl H. Esbeck
those parts which required a female member to prove her spouse's dependency. This is an
established rule of statutory severability previously used by the Court. See note 88, supra.
